

Conference Abstracts

<i>Keynote Speakers</i>	2
Dermot Moran: “Let it Be’: Heidegger and Eckhart on <i>Gelassenheit</i> ”	2
Natalie Depraz: “Phenomenology of Awareness”	2
James Morley: “Meditation and the phenomenology of daydreaming”	2
Havi Carel: “Phenomenology of breathing and breathlessness”	3
Mahon O’Brien: “Being mindful of nothing”	3
<i>Other Speakers</i>	3
Petri Berndtson: “The Reversibility of Mindful Breathing: The Intertwining of the Buddha’s anapanasati and Merleau-Ponty’s Immense Exterior Lung”	3
Francesca Brencio: “Heidegger’s mindfulness”	4
Celia Cabrera: “Emotional Expectations: Husserlian Reflections on our Emotional Relation to the Future and the Possibility of Regulating the Emergence of Stressful Dispositions”	5
Ming-Hon Chu: “Mindfulness as Transcendental Motivation”	5
Joseph Cohen: The Mindfulness of Sacrifice: Towards a Phenomenology of History	6
Anya Daly: “Phenomenology and Mindfulness: The issue of presence in the clinical psychiatric context”	7
Susi Ferrarello: “Husserl and Stoicism: The Theory of Meaning as a Bridge to Mindfulness”	7
Colleen Fitzpatrick: “Mindfulness and The Phenomenology of Aesthetics: Reappraising Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty”	7
Lisa Foran: “Freeing Ourselves from Technology: Rethinking Mindfulness”	8
Christos Hadjoannou: “Heidegger against the Stoics on mindfully overcoming uncanny feelings”	8
Hayden Kee: “Embodiment, Disembodiment, Reembodiment: Insights from Phenomenology and Postural Yoga”	9
Timothy Mooney: “Mindfulness in the early Merleau-Ponty”	9
Jan Puc: “In Defence of Bare Attention: A Phenomenological Interpretation of Mindfulness”	10
Pierrick Simon: “A Levinassian critique of Mindfulness”	10
Max Schaefer: “Mindful Creativity: Tracing a Path to Health Through Michel Henry and Otto Rank”	11
Angelos Sofocleous: “Depression and Mindfulness: Reclaiming the future and one’s belongingness in the world”	11
Odysseus Stone: “A non-observational awareness of mental action that does not commit to the Authorship View”	12
Gerhard Thonhauser: “Mindfulness in Heidegger”	12
Ying-Chien Yang: “The Structure of Self and Affection in Husserl’s Phenomenology and Praxis of Mindfulness”	13
Evie Filea: “Temporality and time experience in mindfulness practice and Heidegger’s <i>Being and Time</i> : common themes and key differences”	14
Clive Zammit: “On Walking Meditation and The Mediative Possibilities for Infinite Responsibility”	15

Keynote Speakers

Dermot Moran: “Let it Be’: Heidegger and Eckhart on *Gelassenheit*”

Among the classical phenomenologists, Martin Heidegger (and his doctoral student Käte Oltmanns) paid most attention to Meister Eckhart. Heidegger read him from 1915 and later called him “the old master of life and letters”. Reiner Schürmann, who visited Heidegger personally in March 1966, also discussed Eckhart with him. This paper will discuss Heidegger’s interpretation of Eckhart, especially his concepts of ‘releasement’ (*Abgeschiedenheit*, Middle High German: *abgescheidenheit*), ‘letting be’ (*Gelassenheit*, Middle High German: *gelâzenheit*) and living ‘without why’ (*Ohne Warum*; MHG: *âne warumbe*). There are related notions that also need to be interpreted, specifically ‘purity’ (*Lauterkeit*, Middle High German: *lûterkeit*), ‘being naked’ (*blôz*), ‘empty’ (*îtel*), ‘free’ (*ledic*). For Eckhart, God is understood as ‘nothing’ (MHG: *nichil*), ‘nothingness’ (MHG: *nibt*; Latin: *nibiletas*, *nulleitas*). But the soul is also required to be empty, open and ‘virginal’ in order to receive the divine and become ‘one with the One’.

In the paper, I will discuss Eckhart’s radical mysticism and assess the accuracy of Heidegger’s interpretation and the contemporary relevance of Eckhart for the understanding of ‘mindfulness’.

Natalie Depraz: “Phenomenology of Awareness”

In their article “Phenomenology and Mindfulness” published in 2021 in *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Odysseus Stone and Dan Zahavi make three claims about phenomenology and buddhism, which are strongly connected:

1. Phenomenology is a philosophical theoretical discipline uniquely concerned with the ‘mind-world’ correlation;
2. Buddhist meditative practice is a practice of paying attention defined as mindfulness;
3. The comparison between phenomenology and buddhism would better be situated on the philosophical level, between philosophical phenomenology and buddhist philosophy, and not on the level of their experiential praxis.

All three claims are not false, but their truth remains poor and reductionist, so that they avoid their very effective confrontation. Furthermore, they delineate a narrow exclusive understanding of phenomenology, of buddhism and of their way of relating to each other. In the following contribution, the author will show that not only are the authors misled in their claims, but they end up contending a reductionist view of phenomenology and of buddhism. In order to do so, the author will unfold more complex understandings of phenomenology as passive receptive, co-embodied and generative oriented, of buddhism as awareness and as self-other equalizing, which allow in turn to unfold a phenomenology of buddhism situated as an experiential praxis.

James Morley: “Meditation and the phenomenology of daydreaming”

Daydreaming is not meditation. In fact, most systems of meditation would view daydreaming as an impediment to the goal of meditative consciousness. Meditation could perhaps even be defined as the overcoming of the chaotic ‘monkey mind’ associated with daydreaming. But instead of approaching daydreaming as a negative to be overcome, this presentation will explore the phenomenology of daydreaming as a means for a better pedagogical understanding of the barriers to learning meditation and perhaps even use daydreaming consciousness as a means for a fuller phenomenologically descriptive account of meditation itself.

The author will review some of the structural results of an ongoing 2nd person phenomenological psychological research project on daydreaming. Then these constituents will be briefly compared to ‘single pointed’ meditation paradigms, such as the classical yoga tradition, as well as the ‘open monitoring’ systems - as applied in tantrism.

The author will conclude with a discussion of the possibility that, contained within the

experiential structure of daydreaming, there may be an access to meditative awareness alluded to in phenomenological literature by such descriptive concepts as the ‘tacit cogito’ (Merleau-Ponty) and ‘marginal consciousness’ (Gurwitsch). It may be that meditative awareness could be viewed as, not just something to be achieved, but something we always already have access to but are yet ambiguously restrained from realising due to our immersion within certain aspects of the natural attitude. Time permitting, we will consider the practical feasibility of this approach to concrete pedagogy.

Havi Carel: “Phenomenology of breathing and breathlessness”

In this paper I will offer a phenomenology of breathing and of breathlessness, using Merleau-Pontian and Heideggerian concepts and themes. I will contrast normal and pathological breathlessness, characterising the former as familiar, non-threatening and contained within one's habitual body, while the latter is alien, threatening and destroys the everyday familiarity of mundane bodily experiences. I will then describe the place of breath in some mindfulness practices, and conclude that breathing is a unique bodily function, with spiritual, emotional, and social significance that goes far beyond its physiological function.

Mahon O'Brien: “Being mindful of nothing”

In a 1938/39 text (*Mindfulness*), Heidegger strives repeatedly to explain the basic impulse behind his thinking. He fixates once more on the elusive meaning of the verb ‘to be’, the concomitant question of nothingness, the interplay of presence and absence, and the overarching project concerning the attempt to leap over the tradition of Western metaphysics to another beginning – one where the question of what being means is asked anew. For this undertaking, something like mindfulness is needed. Mindfulness, at times, is described as the reflective and questioning attitude of a thinking which has not already conflated being with actuality, and thereby distinguished it from absence understood as its negation. Instead, it would be a thinking that understands the enormity of the implications of grasping properly the ontological difference, understanding that being is not itself a being and that the being of something (its emergence as meaningfully present) typically involves an interplay of presence and absence. A question that is rarely asked, or certainly isn't asked enough, is what the implications of Heidegger's attempts to rehabilitate the role that absence plays in our experience and understanding might be. What would it mean to overcome the metaphysics of presence? Heidegger insists again and again that the transformative effect would be momentous. But, can we actually begin to imagine what those implications might be?

Other Speakers

Petri Berndtson: “The Reversibility of Mindful Breathing: The Intertwining of the Buddha's anapanasati and Merleau-Ponty's Immense Exterior Lung”

In my paper, I will investigate the Buddha's meditative method of mindfulness of breathing in dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological ontology.

According to the Buddhist Pali Canon, the Buddha attained the awakened state of *nirvana* as the highest ethical and spiritual way of being through the meditative practice of mindfulness of breathing (*anapanasati*). Literally *anapanasati* means either “mindfulness of inhalation and exhalation” or “remembrance of inhalation and exhalation”. How to understand the meaning of *anapanasati*, that is, the relation between “mindfulness” and “breathing” or “remembrance” and “inhalation-exhalation”? Currently one of the most well-known conceptions of *anapanasati* is from Jon Kabat-Zinn. In his interpretation the relation between *sati* and *anapana* is a relation in which breathing is understood as “an incredibly powerful ally and teacher” of our mindful attitude, that is, of our meditative awareness. As an “ally and teacher” of awareness/mindfulness,

breathing is understood as “a primary object of [meditative] attention” or awareness. Breathing is thus interpreted as the *primary object* of awareness/mindfulness and nothing will challenge in Kabat-Zinn's interpretation the “overriding importance of awareness itself”.

In my paper, I will challenge this Kabat-Zinn's interpretation of the Buddha's *anapanasati* with the help of Merleau-Ponty's notion of reversibility. Merleau-Ponty understands reversibility as the “fundamental phenomenon” and “ultimate truth” of Being, that is, of our entire being-in-the-world. His famous example of reversibility is of a painter who feels that it is not anymore he who looks at the forest, but the trees that look at him. They speak to him and he listens to them. Thus, in reversibility “one no longer knows who/what sees and who/what is seen” or “who/what speaks and who/what listens”. The roles between the perceiver and the perceived, between the awareness itself and the object of awareness are constantly shifting. From the perspective of Merleau-Pontian reversibility, Kabat-Zinn's interpretation of the meditative practice of mindfulness of breathing seems too straightforward. Within this atmosphere of reversibility, mindfulness/awareness and breathing are intertwined in a way that the person practicing *anapanasati* no longer knows who/what is aware and who/what breathes, who/what is subject and who/what is object. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, we can actually find Merleau-Ponty's very brief description of such a respiratory reversibility. In this description he writes of the process of falling asleep as follows: “I was breathing slowly and deeply to call forth sleep, and suddenly, one might say, my mouth communicates with some immense exterior lung that calls my breath forth and forces it back, a certain respiratory rhythm...becomes my very being”.

In my challenge to Kabat-Zinn's interpretation of the Buddha's *anapanasati* as a path to *nirvana* I will especially use as a source of inspiration these Merleau-Ponty's words about respiratory reversibility. I will investigate, for example, could we by breathing slowly and deeply call forth, instead of sleep, the awakening experience of *nirvana* and could we interpret *nirvana* as mindful respiratory communication with “some immense exterior lung”, because etymologically *nirvana* means “blowing out”. What could be mindful reversibility of *nirvana* as respiratory blowing out?

Francesca Brencio: “Heidegger's mindfulness”

The English translation of Martin Heidegger's work *Besinnung* (volume 65 of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*) is *Mindfulness*. The volume, one of the seven major ontological treatises composed by the author between 1936-1942, is a turning point in his pathway toward the question of being. In this period, Heidegger seeks to understand the truth of being in terms of the experience of its own historical enactment, showing how “the truth of being” may be conceived as the “being-historical thinking”. Through this contribution I aim to show how Heidegger's post-war meditation may be regarded as a form of embodied experience of mindfulness strictly tied to the exercise of *Gelassenheit*, an ongoing embodied act of letting go of willing, that shapes our thinking and living in the original openness of our being. In reaching these goals, this contribution is grounded on three main sections: in the first one, I will rebuild Heidegger's two sources on the issue of being, namely the logical and the phenomenological ones, stressing the most important moments of his meditation on the issue of being; in the second section, I will discuss the notion of *Besinnung* conceived as Heidegger's understanding of the truth of being, and its consequences in thinking, underlying the distance with metaphysical (and thus technical) thinking; finally, I will put in relation this notion of mindfulness with the act of *Gelassenheit*, unveils the many points of contacts of Heidegger's meditation and the Asian thought. Conceived as the transition from willing into releasement, the late meditation of Heidegger may be regarded as an embodied practice of phenomenology which requires the displacement of subjectivity at the borders of ontology, a movement from an ego-logical perspective into an eco-logical one.

Celia Cabrera: “Emotional Expectations: Husserlian Reflections on our Emotional Relation to the Future and the Possibility of Regulating the Emergence of Stressful Dispositions”

According to Husserl, all our present experiences involve an expectation regarding the future. In recently published manuscripts, Husserl distinguishes two forms of expectations: intellectual expectations, as the simple foreseeing of the future, equivalent to remembering, and emotional expectations (*Gemütservartungen*) (Hua XLIII/3, 387). The latter describes “the emotionally being anxious about what is coming” (Hua XXXVIII, 106). This understanding of expectation as a “tension” (*Spannung*) would correspond to a specific emotional form of being oriented towards the future. This raises the question of how the complex relation of emotional and intellectual expectations should be understood, and which is its specific emotional dimension.

As I will argue, Husserl’s phenomenological reflections on this topic can provide rich theoretical tools for understanding some key issues of mindfulness-based approaches. Emotional expectations are involved in single anticipatory emotions, but they can also go beyond particular events and configure a general style of anticipating what the future will bring. In this case, they become dispositions. For that reason, even when we are not expecting something particular there is always at play an emotional horizon of expecting. Hence the relevance of the topic for mindfulness: Even though the development of emotional dispositions is inevitable, some dispositions can have damaging consequences for our wellbeing. This is the case, for instance, when their content is excessively determined, giving place to a stressful feeling. According to Husserl, understanding the emergence of dispositions requires considering them in their motivational relation to present and past experiences (Hua Mat VIII, 18; Hua XXII, 142, 411). This dynamic relation allows, on the one hand, to explain why the content of what is anticipated is more or less determined, and why expectations are in some cases stronger than in others. On the other, to account for the possibility to concentrate on the present, a possibility that seems to be threatened when attention constantly “chases” the future and brings it to the present, and when past experiences are “projected” into the present and the future.

In this background, the paper aims to explore the phenomenon of emotional expectation according to Husserl, and to analyze its possible contribution to a deep understanding of a key issue in mindfulness-based approaches, broadly understood: the possibility to focus on present experience. First, I will discuss the meaning of emotional expectations and their relation to intellectual expectations. Second, I will elucidate the transformation of emotional expectations in dispositions. Third, I will address the possibility of regulating the emergence of stressful emotional dispositions. This requires analyzing the role of reflection and volition in redirecting attention (a) to present experiences and (b) to those emotions that draw us away from the present. Even though every experience involves past, present, and future temporal modes, attention, as a modification of intensity, can “favor” one of them (Hua XXXVIII, 75, 97-98). By providing an account of the intertwinement between intellectual and emotional aspects involved in expectations, Husserlian phenomenology can contribute to answering central questions laying beneath mindfulness theories, e.g., to those concerning the relationship between emotions, judgments, and beliefs.

Ming-Hon Chu: “Mindfulness as Transcendental Motivation”

In this paper, I study the relation between phenomenology and mindfulness in the framework of “transcendental motivation”, which is still an underestimated field of research to this day. As I am going to show, Fink’s methodological considerations in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation are particularly pertinent for unfolding this project.

The growing interest among philosophers in the relation between phenomenology and mindfulness is mainly driven by the question: how far do the two practices resemble each other? On the one hand, someone argues for their experiential affinities, and thereby suggests that

training in mindfulness is advisable or even compulsory to the accomplishment of phenomenology. On the other hand, someone else insists on the fundamental difference between the two, despite accepting the possibility of their cross-fertilisation. While I do not attempt to offer a solution to this debate, I aim at clarifying the proper framework for evaluating the significance of mindfulness to phenomenology, namely, the motivation for performing epoché and reduction, or what Husserl alternatively calls the “beginning of philosophy”.

The problem of motivation is crucial to phenomenology in both a practical and a theoretical manner. Practically speaking, it is questionable how epoché and reduction can be carried out, provided the psychological difficulties in abstaining from the natural attitude, say, in controlling one’s attention. Thereby, philosophers like Natalie Depraz and Michel Bitbol have elaborated extensively how mindfulness training can instruct or even elevate the practice of phenomenology. Theoretically speaking, inquiry of the motivation to phenomenology is a necessary step to achieve scientific self-clarification, or what Fink terms the “transcendental theory of method”. Fink differentiates carefully between psychological and transcendental motivation and defines the latter as the condition of possibility to effectuate the phenomenological attitude to its radical end. In contrast to Husserl, Fink does not rely on any rational teleology in this respect and suggests an open variety of “extreme situations” as basic events for the establishment of philosophy. This openness regarding the problem of transcendental motivation is especially praised by Hans Rainer Sepp as representing the “radical democracy” of phenomenology.

While Fink is not the only philosopher who has contributed to the study of motivation to phenomenology, his account opens a promising horizon for reviewing the relation between phenomenology and different sorts of “limit-experience” (Bataille). In addition to anxiety, boredom, nausea, revelation, etc., which are all limit-experiences explored by different phenomenologists as potential motivations to a world-alienating attitude, I propose to treat mindfulness as a theme to be studied within this framework. Two advantages follow: (1) the homology between two practices can thereby be more thoroughly appreciated with its theoretical significance; (2) like the cases of other limit-experiences, this approach to mindfulness does not presuppose any point-to-point correspondence between two practices. Their abnormal structure in common suffices to shed light on the beginning of philosophy.

Joseph Cohen: The Mindfulness of Sacrifice: Towards a Phenomenology of History

This contribution will seek to deploy the preliminary grounds for a phenomenology of History. Through the analyses of both Husserl’s “transcendental phenomenology” and Heidegger’s “Thought of Being”, the general aim of this chapter will be to present and develop the meaning, the intentionality and the context from which arises the “mindfulness” of History. In this sense, the author will engage - whilst underlying their inherent differences - both Husserl’s phenomenological method and Heidegger’s retrieval of phenomenology in the question pertaining to the meaning of Being in a confrontation with the “historical event” and therefore in an exposition to that which remains singular in “being-historical”. Through this confrontation and exposition, the author will see the significance of sacrifice emerge as the essential element in which the incessant play between “polis” and “polemos” shows itself in History and where aporetically occurs the persistent call for a justice in the name of the irreducible singular historical event. This chapter will hence put forth the idea of a justice for each singular historical event which resists and therefore remains irreconcilable with the sacrificial economy of History. This idea of justice will be seen to open towards a novel concept of “historical mindfulness”, one not only referring to the advent of truth, but, and through a radical contestation of the forms of historical recognition and commemoration, calling onto an unconditional and unconditioned responsibility for the singular.

Anya Daly: “Phenomenology and Mindfulness: The issue of presence in the clinical psychiatric context”

Phenomenology has proven immensely valuable in the psychiatric context to better understand anomalous experience and psychopathology since the time of Jaspers in the early 20th century. Now, ‘mindfulness’ is being promoted as one of the key treatment methods to establish more balance in the life of individuals challenged with mental health issues. Phenomenology and mindfulness come together in the foregrounding of sensation, bodily awareness and fine tuned attention to experience. This paper examines how the quality of attentive presence the psychiatrist/ therapist brings to the encounter with the individual experiencing mental health challenges is crucial to both understanding and healing. How is presence achieved and sustained in this encounter?

Susi Ferrarello: “Husserl and Stoicism: The Theory of Meaning as a Bridge to Mindfulness”

In this paper the author will use Stoicism and Husserl’s phenomenology to flesh out the constitutive moments in which our bodily language and its embodied logic react to certain stimuli in order to see how we can rewire our negative answers to certain stimuli. Similar to athletes that have been trained on how to react to certain set of perceptions related to their discipline, I would examine how we can expand that very short window of time—100 to 140 milliseconds—to train our brain to answer certain stimuli in a way that is conducive to our well-being.

In particular, Husserl’s theory of noema and Stoics’ theory of *lekton* focus on the most crucial moment of the presence that we as human beings can exert toward the here and now of our lived-experiences. In both theories we see how the problem of sense, meant as concreteness of reality that we encounter in our experience, influences our way to form self-determining reflections that shape our character and the way in which we react to life.

Hence, in this paper Ferrarello will first show the continuity between Stoicism and phenomenology, to then move toward a more detailed confrontation between the theory of the *lekton* in Stoicism and the theory of noema in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, I will show how these theories apply in both phenomenological and Stoic ethics and what they can tell us about choosing to live a happy, flourishing life.

Colleen Fitzpatrick: “Mindfulness and The Phenomenology of Aesthetics: Reappraising Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty”

Phenomenological philosophy mirrors mindful approaches to the world, emphasising embodiment, lived experience and perception. This is most evident in the phenomenology of aesthetics. When aesthetic experience, especially painting, is understood through the lens of phenomenology, it echoes mindfulness practice. Both Merleau-Ponty and Dufrenne, unwittingly, describe how mindfulness theory meets the phenomenology of aesthetics at the juncture of perception.

Merleau-Ponty maintains that painting achieves access to being through heightened vision, giving visible extension to what profane vision believes to be invisible. The painter brings our awareness to actually seeing the world. Painting points to aspects of the visual that are already there only we did not notice them, thrusting us into the present world of lived experience, we encounter objects that do not quickly pass before our eyes but hold our gaze. In other words, we encounter these objects mindfully.

Dufrenne reiterates this point: we believe that art repeats what we have seen because we can identify what art represents but art presents new perspectives, which focus our attention, opening up new worlds. According to Dufrenne, “perception begins with art.”

Dufrenne's phenomenology of aesthetics centres on being present, focused, non-judgemental and attentive, concepts also given primary importance in the philosophy of mindfulness. Dufrenne emphasises the psychological and ontological significance of aesthetic experience in terms which lend itself ideally to understanding its relation with mindfulness.

According to Merleau-Ponty, "art gives visible extension to what profane vision believes to be invisible. The painter brings our awareness to actually seeing the world; what we see is always incomplete." Dufrenne focuses on the spectator, who is invited to be and not do, but actively participates. This practice roots us from our comfort zone in order to bring us face to face with a new world, which demands a new outlook.

In mindfulness meditation practice, there are no actions to perform. However the person is actively engaged. A common feature in these theories is that the world remains to be uncovered and there are interventions which facilitate the process of living in the world of momentary experience. This paper argues that aesthetic experience, particularly painting, is one such intervention. Phenomenology allows both mindfulness and painting to be understood in more comprehensive terms than that of their meanings considered individually.

Lisa Foran: "Freeing Ourselves from Technology: Rethinking Mindfulness"

'Wellness Clinics', 'Lunchtime Mindfulness Zooms', 'Mindful Communities', 'Wellness Toolkits' are terms and practices that have become particularly widespread in post-COVID workplaces. They offer a cost-effective salve to employers wishing to appear to tackle the trauma of the last two years that is manifesting in a widespread mental health crisis. In this paper Foran argues that these practices are symptoms of the broader techno-corporate corruption of Buddhist thought. Martin Heidegger's 1959 text *Gelassenheit* describes how 'releasement towards things and openness to the mystery' can free us from the domination of technical devices. Taken with the earlier *Die Frage nach der Technik* (1954), it offers a prescient account of the dangers of encountering the world as a mere source for our functional ends.

Foran opens the chapter by using the treatment of technology as a means of comparing *Gelassenheit* in Heidegger's later thought and contemporary accounts of mindfulness practice. Taking up scholarship on the relation between Marx and Heidegger (Axelos, Zimmerman) she argues that the problems of a technological enframing of the world can be productively paralleled (although not directly mapped) to a Marxist critique of capitalist society. Following this, she claims that mindfulness has itself been co-opted into a techno-capitalist framework. In a manner analogous to Heidegger's reformulation of philosophy as a 'poetic thinking', mindfulness too may need to be reformulated to shirk the sediments of its corporatisation.

Christos Hadjioannou: "Heidegger against the Stoics on mindfully overcoming uncanny feelings"

This paper will compare and contrast two competing models of mindfulness, a Heideggerian model and a Stoic model, focussing on the way they respectively theorize affective states and the normative ideal of "well-being", thus delineating opposing stances and therapeutic options regarding extremely negative, uncanny, feelings. The first section will clarify the Stoic idea of the "sage" and the ideal of freedom from emotions (*apatheia*). Emotions will be theorized using a cognitivist model and will be identified as products of (bad) judgment, which must and can be eliminated cognitively. Then, the section will analyze the "naturalist principle" of *oikeiōsis* ("appropriation", "familiarization") as a form of mindfulness, which permeates the whole process of becoming sage.

The second section will look at Heidegger's early phenomenology. It will argue that in *Being and Time* the "Heideggerian sage" (the human being that exists "authentically") is someone who does not try to overcome angst, but rather cultivates a comportment that *embraces* existential anxiety. Here, the "sage" is called to own up to their latent angst and sense of

unhomeliness/uncanniness, a feeling that amounts to a philosophical destination and which rehabilitates the human being's existential condition and its "well being", bringing it back to its unsettled "nature". Finally, the Heideggerian model of mindfulness (resoluteness) will be conceived along the lines of phronetic prudence, rather than a cognitivist-reflective model that characterizes Stoic mindfulness.

Hayden Kee: "Embodiment, Disembodiment, Reembodiment: Insights from Phenomenology and Postural Yoga"

As infants, we have everything to learn about our bodies. Our bodies are our sensorimotor vehicle for being in the world and the proprioceptive and affective locus of our existence. In order to become organised embodied selves, babies experiment with sensorimotor activity through what developmental psychologists call "body babbling." However, as we develop through childhood into adulthood, many of us cease to experiment with our bodies. We settle into routine ways of bodily being in which our bodies become a diaphanous, overlooked means for our agency in the world. We grow accustomed to neglecting or repressing bodily inclinations and sensations for the sake of being appropriately civilised. And our constant involvement with a world of tasks-to-do means we are often beyond ourselves, displaced somewhere and somewhere else, living in worlds of possibility rather than allowing our awareness to rest in our inalienable basis and anchor in actuality: our bodies. As a result, there is an important sense in which many of us live practically disembodied lives. Further, trauma or other forms of bodily disorganisation leave many living in constant fear and repression of their own bodily sensations. Against this background, contemplative movement practices such as postural yoga present an opportunity to rediscover our bodies, to learn to babble again. Through yoga, we may learn to playfully inhabit our bodies and reappropriate our most fundamental medium of experience in the world. In this talk I will draw from phenomenology to interpret bodily yoga teachings and practice. I will suggest that there is a possibility for a sort of "mutual enlightenment" between the theoretical component of postural yoga philosophy and phenomenology. I first discuss how various familiar conceptions from phenomenology (e.g., the *Leib-Koerper* distinction, and the body-schema versus body-image distinction) have counterparts in the yoga tradition. The author then suggests how the range of bodily yoga practices, such as breathing and postural activities, present us with means for exploring and refining such conceptions. The author concludes by arguing that yoga theory and practice may provide novel perspectives on classic questions in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, such as debates concerning the minimal self. While Buddhist perspectives have generally been marshalled to argue against the existence of a minimal phenomenal self, Kee suggests that the tradition of postural yoga provides an alternative vision of an embodied minimal self that is more amenable to many contemporary phenomenologists.

Timothy Mooney: "Mindfulness in the early Merleau-Ponty"

In *The Structure of Behaviour and Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty characterises the essentially embodied subject as an essentially projective existent. It does not just live in a world of proximate opportunities and threats, but is situated in the virtual as the further future. This is due to the projective imagination and the skilled and schematised body with its motor intentional schematisations of postures and perceptual fields. Yet Merleau-Ponty does not see projection in exclusively imaginative and volitional terms, that is, as the being cast into and the choosing of self-transformative courses of action. Many of our projects are solicited by the things themselves as determinable indeterminacies that draw us closer, not to command them, but to appreciate their singularities or perceptual styles. I will suggest that in his descriptions of living amongst and towards the things he proffers a kind of mindfulness that explicitly evokes much of the wonder, magic and enjoyment of childhood.

Jan Puc: “In Defence of Bare Attention: A Phenomenological Interpretation of Mindfulness”

‘Mindfulness’ is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought to contemporary Western psychology. However, whilst mindfulness was already an ambiguous term in the original context, specified more by a set of practices than by a clear definition, its cross-cultural transmission has blurred its content even further. In this paper, I assess the recent criticism of the widespread definition of mindfulness as non-elaborative, purely receptive ‘bare attention’. According to the critics of bare attention, what can be characterized as purely receptive is the automatic turning of attention toward an object. But should mindfulness be a quality of consciousness that is to be established and developed by the reflexive practice of meditation, it must be something more than this automatic turning of attention. This paper shows how the definition of mindfulness as bare attention can be defended by explicating it in terms of the phenomenological model of attention.

Pierrick Simon: “A Levinassian critique of Mindfulness”

If we recognize that mindfulness is a phenomenological endeavour, but also that it is *explicitly* therapeutic in a way that Western phenomenological projects tend not to be, we are well equipped to perform a fruitful comparison, one which clarifies both mindfulness and phenomenology as *methods*. I will demonstrate that Levinas’ critique of phenomenology is a great resource for those who want to achieve this comparison to the fullest, and reap its fruits.

First of all, the way mindfulness makes us aware of affective phenomena helps us clarify key intuitions that are necessary to comprehend what is at stake in Levinas’ critique. All too often, for lack of those intuitions, Levinas’ thought is presented as circular: it is said that Levinas rejects the idea that our experience is reducible to the self-sufficiency of object-consciousness because of non-epistemic ethical arguments that already presuppose that experience is not structured this way, or ought not to be. Levinas’ phenomenology is said to be a “*method of pleonasm*” (Sebbah, F-D; 2007) where redundancy is meant to persuade the reader. Even seen as a feature of his philosophy, and not as a fallacy, it greatly reduces the scope of his project. On the contrary, the starting point of Levinas’ philosophy is the “*method of oxymoron*”: the contrast between the equanimous self-sufficiency of consciousness and vulnerability. His rhetoric is that of a striking contrast between the actuality of peace of mind and the possibility of suffering. Once understood this way, Levinas’ work is essential to think about the limits of mindfulness and phenomenology. Levinas suspects that, though the phenomenologist *seems* to adopt a stance exclusively concerned with epistemological matters, they are in fact moved by a *therapeutic* concern, which can be criticised morally. This concern can be conceived as a search for *equanimity*: consciousness seeks to cancel alterity, by translating it into intentional objects, so that it stops being bothered by it. Levinas argues that phenomenologists erase alterity *at the onset*, because of their commitment to go back to “things in themselves”. In these conditions, a true phenomenology of suffering is impossible. *Equanimity* is a presupposition which is built-into the phenomenological method from the start, limiting its scope as a philosophy. Is this to say that mindfulness is inherently bound to immoral solipsism? Is this a damning moral critique of phenomenology? No, the point of Levinas is not to preach for a particular ethics but to think about the limits of phenomenology. Through this lens, *mindfulness* is seen, not as an all-encompassing phenomenology, but as a practical project with a limited purview: the reduction of suffering. As for phenomenology, it could only be all-encompassing if it were less *mindfulness-like*. However, strong contemplative skills, fostered by meditation, reveal that the subject cannot be guaranteed as “*the last spectator of consciousness*” (Levinas), which is a crucial ingredient for those who want to broaden phenomenology by way of criticising its fundamental tenets. In the end, both phenomenology and mindfulness can be improved through these insights.

Max Schaefer: “Mindful Creativity: Tracing a Path to Health Through Michel Henry and Otto Rank”

Through a study of French phenomenologist Michel Henry and Austrian psychoanalyst Otto Rank, this paper endeavours to clarify the role of mindfulness in the flourishing of human life. I argue that the work of Henry and Rank are united in their suggestion that mindfulness is essential to the development of a creative personality that is essential to the flourishing of human life. In making this case, my paper will not only elucidate the role of mindfulness in creative activity and in enabling human beings to achieve psychological health, but it will be the first to draw together the kindred spirits of Henry and the influential, albeit still largely overlooked, work of Rank.

The opening section of my paper sheds light on Henry’s account of how the subject forgets and recovers her basis in life, understood as the creative drive or auto-affective movement that brings the subject into her flesh and its various powers. I contend that there is an unresolved tension in Henry’s account of the forgetting and recollection of life: while Henry maintains that life, in its absolute priority over the intentional acts of consciousness to which it gives rise, is responsible for the subject’s forgetting and subsequent recovery of her basis in life, his study of acts of barbarism (i.e., acts of self-destruction) and culture (i.e., acts of self-growth) make it clear that intentional acts themselves play an essential role in these transformation of life. In particular, I argue that Henry’s description of the recovery and flourishing of life’s creative potential suggests that a certain mindfulness on the part of the subject is necessarily involved in these processes. For Henry, this mindfulness consists in an awareness of the role of life in constituting the world — i.e., that it is ultimately life and not the ego that makes possible our sense of the world — and in thus letting the know-how of life be (i.e., not only recognizing life but letting it have a dynamic role in our creative engagements).

In the following section, I show how the work of Rank significantly extends Henry’s account of mindfulness, and of how this mindfulness is essential to the flourishing of life’s creativity. In my view, Rank’s work does this by virtue of the fact that it stands in agreement with Henry’s account of life as a creative activity — i.e., a movement that is bent on its own growth through the production of new affects, thoughts, and values — and by highlighting life’s essential ambiguity. By laying out Rank’s approach to existential psychotherapy, I demonstrate that Rank seeks to foster a sense of mindfulness in which the individual attains a more expansive vision of the world by coming to recognize that life assumes various habits and traditions, and that the habits of one’s own tradition are not the only or even necessarily the best way of living. By doing so, as I show, the sense of mindfulness developed by Rank frees the individual up to achieve psychological health by better enabling her to accept herself and to create an ideal that will focus her activity and enable her to creatively affirm her individuality in union with others and the cosmos.

Angelos Sofocleous: “Depression and Mindfulness: Reclaiming the future and one’s belongingness in the world”

Certain first-person accounts from depressed individuals include reports of the future being experienced as pre-determined, bleak, or even non-existent. According to Husserl, our experience of time involves ‘protention’, i.e., an anticipation of what will happen in the immediate future, manifested as a set of actualizable future possibilities. In this sense, the experience of depression can be described as lacking anticipation, expressed as a loss of contingency, both in respect to the present and to the future. Consider the following testimony by a depressed individual, taken from the Durham Depression Questionnaire: When I’m not depressed, other possibilities exist. Maybe I won’t fail, maybe life isn’t completely pointless, maybe they do care about me, maybe I do have some good qualities.

When depressed, these possibilities simply do not exist. What such accounts demonstrate is the absence of possibilities from the depressed individual's world, something which can also be experienced as inhabiting a different world. I argue that what further exacerbates feelings of detachment and not belonging in the world is the depressed individual's awareness that possibilities are available to, and actualizable by, other individuals, in this way being manifested as possibilities-for-other, but not as possibilities-for-her. With the closure of future possibilities, the present is experienced as devoid of opportunities for change, and as static, hence also resembling the past.

First-person testimonies of temporal experience in depression also include reports that time has slowed down, stopped, or even that one is detached from the concept of time. Such an experience of time, along with one's experience of a bleak or non-existent future, result in one feeling 'trapped' in the present, hence why we can additionally notice various reports of the individual feeling 'incarcerated', 'isolated', and 'alienated' from the world, also disrupting how they experience the life-world (*Lebenswelt*).

In this paper, the author suggests that practicing mindfulness can help one reclaim their sense of contingency in the world, their feelings of belonging, and experiencing worldly possibilities as actualizable, by altering one's temporal experience. Certain experiments (e.g., Kramer et al., 2013, Droit-Volet et al., 2019) have demonstrated the effects of mindfulness on time perception, reporting that participants who practiced mindfulness meditation overestimated time durations, in this way counterbalancing the experience of time as slow or dragging in depression. By focusing on the present moment and paying attention on how different behaviors or activities (e.g., breathing, eating) are experienced, one can realize the present not as being detached and separated from the past and future, but, following Husserl, as being layered, including retention of past moments and protention of future moments. In this way, the present and future can be experienced as open, contingent, and imbued with possibilities, allowing the depressed individual to regain their sense of belongingness in the world and of connectedness to themselves, worldly objects, other people, and thereby the world.

Odysseus Stone: "A non-observational awareness of mental action that does not commit to the Authorship View"

In recent year philosophers and psychologists have shown increased interest in mindfulness meditation. In this context, mindfulness is being widely viewed as a means of becoming aware of and regulating attention. There are a number of different ways in which to understand this process. On one view - the Self-monitoring View - mindfulness involves an introspective attention of attention itself. This view runs into a number of difficulties. One concerns how it squares with the so-called transparency of experience: the idea that phenomenal character depends in part on the way the world appears. Another concern is that it raises the difficult question of who or what is doing the monitoring. As an alternative, a recent suggestion in the philosophy of mind by Watzl (2017) is that we might understand awareness of attention on the model of awareness of action. On this view, awareness of attention is not a matter of observing attention, but of being aware of our engaging in the activity of attending (i.e., of structuring our experiential lives in a particular way). I will argue that Watzl's view runs into problems associated with the so-called Authorship View of the self, the idea that there is a self detached from immersed action that authors our doings (cf. Ganeri 2017). Drawing upon the phenomenology of Husserl and Gurwitsch, I will repurpose the idea of a non-observational awareness of mental action that does not commit us to the Authorship View. In closing, I will briefly situate the discussion on self-awareness in mindfulness to existing debates in the philosophical literature concerning selfhood, agency, and attention.

Gerhard Thonhauser: "Mindfulness in Heidegger"

The purpose of this contribution is to defend a specific understanding of mindfulness that can

be found in Heidegger's work. The core argument is that there is a common thought underlying both Heidegger's early notion of *Eigentlichkeit* and his later notions of *Besinnung* and *Gelassenheit*, and that uncovering that thought allows us to put forward an intriguing understanding of mindfulness. Heidegger's core thought is complex, but might be summarized as follows:

1. Being itself is historical, which implies that all ontologies (=guiding understandings of being) are finite in two senses:

- a. They are selective: the way in which entities reveal themselves to us now excludes other possible ways of revealing.
- b. They are historically variable: Our guiding understanding of entities has changed over time, and we should expect future changes.

2. Although ontologies are finite, they are nevertheless very powerful: they define at each time what is ontologically and epistemologically possible.

Ignoring minor differences in emphasis between the early and late Heidegger, he offers the following core understanding of mindfulness: Existing mindfully means to exist with an awareness of the above-mentioned core thought. In short, it means to exist with an awareness

1. that being is historical and that all ontologies are finite,

2. but that reigning ontologies are nevertheless very powerful.

Hence, mindfulness has nothing to do with finding one's true or authentic self; in fact, one could even argue that Heidegger defends a no-self theory (intriguingly relating him to Buddhist thought). Consequently, mindfulness cannot consist in self retreat either.

Moreover, mindfulness cannot reasonably imply that one should restrain from engaging with current affairs (thus bringing the Heideggerian proposal in an interesting tension with meditative and Stoic practices).

Instead, Heideggerian mindfulness asks those who are mindful to engage in current affairs, but to do so mindfully. That means acting in light of an awareness

1. that things do not need to be the way they currently are, and thus, one should

- a. be open for things to show themselves in unexpected ways, and
- b. be ready to revoke one's current understanding in light of new disclosures.

2. However, one should also be aware that change is very unlikely to happen and cannot be brought about by force.

Ying-Chien Yang: "The Structure of Self and Affection in Husserl's Phenomenology and Praxis of Mindfulness"

In mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT), mindfulness meditation brings the patients back to their present experience and puts the mind-body relation in a harmonious coordination through breath. They return back to the present experience, holding the bare-awaring to observe how the beliefs and ideas leading to destructive emotion in their mind appear and accepting them. The I takes distance to its own old beliefs that leads to depression. The patients become aware of the harming thought pattern and try to be free from the old assumptions (Fennel&Segal 2013; Cf. Kabat-Zinn 1990).

From the author's perspective, a successful practice of mindfulness meditation lies in the fact that one can detach itself from their living experience of negative emotions and act as a pure observer with high concentration and attention. From a successful practice, we can raise some theoretical questions such as: How is this distancing of oneself away from its own affective

experience possible? Who is actually watching and what is observed through the practice? Am I not the same as the one living through these affective experiences?

The aim of this paper is to try to find out what theory of self and consciousness Husserl's phenomenology can provide us, to clarify the possibility of a successful introspection. What kind of theoretical relationship between the I and its living experiences is implied in the mindful practice? This dialogue between phenomenology and the practice of mindfulness touches one of the deepest theoretical issues of the self in consciousness. Is there an identical abiding self, many different selves or even non-self in the stream of consciousness?

To address these questions I will discuss Husserl's structure of living experience as explained in *Experience and Judgment* and the theoretical attitude with which the I analyses reflectively and introspectively the structure of living experience. Moreover, I will also compare the results of the research with the basic thoughts of self and consciousness in Buddhist philosophy (Dreyfus 2011; Varela et al. 1991).

Evie Filea: "Temporality and time experience in mindfulness practice and Heidegger's *Being and Time*: common themes and key differences"

In this paper I explore some common themes as well as some key differences between Heidegger's account of temporality in *Being and Time* and mindfulness' approach to temporality and time experience.

Both views seem to share the same starting point, observing that in daily life we get caught up in different pragmatic projects or rushing through activities always attending to something, expecting something to happen in the future, or reckoning something that happened in the past. Such perception of temporality, as an infinite sequence of 'nows' or as a time-for-something, is considered by both accounts to be distracting us from getting in contact with our unique and whole self.

For both Mindfulness theorists and Heidegger, primordial temporality, the only authentic time, is timeless and cannot be accessed when one is caught up in everyday activities. Both accounts put a lot of emphasis on the conditions required for one to shift their common perception of time, which involves a certain form of detachment from the everyday way of living one's life to be able to see things anew. This is the main characteristic of both meditation practice and the authentic mode of resoluteness respectively. They are both described as the moments when one, perceiving and accepting things as they are in the present moment, reconnects with their true self and realises their full potential. Main requirements to achieve such a phenomenological shift, is for one to acknowledge their past as an ineradicable part of their present life, and to adopt a certain orientation towards their own lived experience with is characterised by curiosity, openness and freedom from conditioned perceptions and reactions about their past and future.

However, whereas in both accounts the daily perception of temporality is similarly viewed as functioning on autopilot, as daydreaming, as one being numb, asleep, or unconscious, the moment of 'breaking free' from it, is described radically differently. For Heidegger, the moment of detachment from the everyday, inauthentic, and irresolute way of existing, which he calls the moment of vision (*Augenblick*), is always linked to anxiety in the face of grasping the full complexity and depth of one's finitude. It is seen as an almost violent event which forces Dasein to confront its own most potentiality for selfhood. This is in straight contrast to how mindfulness practitioners describe the interruption from this infinite dealing with things in our environment which typically abounds us. Mindfulness practitioners suggest that this phenomenological shift happens through residing in stillness and when shifting our attention to an eternal present. This moment is associated with peacefulness, and calmness, in opposition to the preoccupation by our daily encountering with the world which for mindfulness practitioners is seen as an always stressful and overwhelming experience.

Clive Zammit: “On Walking Meditation and The Mediative Possibilities for Infinite Responsibility”

In this paper I present a number of phenomenological experiments designed and undertaken to furnish insights into 'what it is like to be human', and argue that the practice of Mindful Walking/walking meditation may reveal a space from which the practitioner's response to the moral demand for the Other may approach infinite responsibility.

The initial experiments of this study sought to explore the experience of early cave dwellers on the cusp of making the step from proto humans to sapiens (Bataille). My approach was to create experiences which are as close as possible to those of early cave dwelling painters. These phenomenological experiments led me to travel to the cuevas de Los manos in Patagonia where I could spend time experiencing the caves and their art within their remote surroundings, in solitude. These experiences led to the insight/hypothesis that the condition of being human can be described as being caught mid-step between joy and terror.

To follow this thought I decided to focus on a closer exploration of the experience of walking in remote areas. I have been exploring this idea through the practice of walking meditation for which I have just completed over 500 km of walking in the Nepali Himalayas. Closer to the more philosophical relevance of these experiments in experiential phenomenology, I have used these experiences to reflect on the validity of the main objection to Mindfulness, mainly the argument that this practice leads to self centered detachment and therefore moral failure. Drawing on both my practice and Levinasian thought, I am currently working on the argument that rather than leading to moral failure, the persistent and genuine practice of mindful walking can enable the subject to respond to the Other from a truly detached and selfless stance. At first glance it may appear that in the practice of Mindfulness the insistence on focusing on the 'now' seems to go directly opposite to the Levinas' thought that the 'now' traps us in repetition and insistence of the self which shuts out both the possibility of a free response to the moral demand of the Other as well as the possibility of a genuine future which is not a repetition or insistence of the present. Contrary to this, I argue that the persistent practice of Mindfulness enables the subject to respond to the Other in a manner which is not limited by references to past experience or calculations of future consequences, but a response that engages fully with the immediate (now) demand of the Other. A response to the Other from the meditative space is a response which can reach towards infinite responsibility. This becomes possible because the practice of meditation releases the mind from the closed limited circuitry of logical/ rational thought and clears a space for the mind to draw on its full cognitive potential which includes the ability to witness and empathise with human needs and suffering, which run deeper than ratiom thought.

I would therefore argue that a truly meditative stance can make possible an infinitely responsible response, that is, a response that in tradition Western linear, rational thought is usually considered as involving an impossible demand.